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“No Sales Below Cost”
By Warren W. Nissley

Now that the national recovery administration and the act
which created it have passed into history there is an inclination to
regard the whole adventure as a closed incident—merely a costly
experiment which failed. Since, however, there are already re
ports of attempts to revive it, we would do well to see if there are
not lessons to be remembered and experiences of which we well
may take advantage if this method of economic control is again
brought forward.
One of the underlying theories of that portion of the “new
deal” which embraced N. R. A. was that all would be well if
everyone deserving of employment were employed and, in addi
tion, were paid a fair wage. Inasmuch as the conditions with
which we were faced were very different from this ideal—and
few intelligent persons would deny that it would be ideal—it is
not surprising that the code makers were attracted by the theory.
But they made a common mistake in attempting to use the end
desired as the means of arriving at that end. As a result, trade
and industry were given, as the law of the land, codes which put
definite limitations on the minimum wages to be paid to employees
and the hours they could work, and, in many cases, the hours
during which machinery could be operated were also limited.
While business leaders endorsed the primary economic object
of the codes, which was to have industry voluntarily agree to
employ more people and thus alleviate unemployment, and to
pay more aggregate wages for the same work, thus increasing the
purchasing power of the masses and promoting recovery from
the depression, it was quite natural that they should ask, to use
a slang expression, “What will we use for money?” From the
financial and accounting viewpoint, it is obvious that an employer
can only pay wages out of the sales price of his goods or out of the
working-capital portion of his capital funds. As a practical
matter, at any given time, he can pay them only out of the cash
he has in hand. It is obvious, for example, that a great corpora
tion can not use any portion of its huge capital investments in
plant and equipment nor even its inventories and accounts
receivable to pay wages.
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The working capital of many employers had been depleted
almost to the vanishing point by the depression years. Cash
operating losses, including wages, had been met by paying out cash
realized from the partial liquidation of other working-capital
assets. This liquidation was possible because smaller quantities
of goods could be carried in stock and at a lower cost per unit;
and open accounts with customers were also less because of the
reduced volume of business. It was only this partial liquidation
that enabled many concerns to avoid the necessity of going into
bankruptcy during the first few of the depression years. The
recovery, which has already begun, will again involve larger
working capital investments in inventories and receivables
which must be paid for from cash on hand or new borrowings.
Consequently, even if those employers who still had cash resources
had been altruistic enough to consent to dissipate them more
rapidly on a voluntary basis, it would have appeared most
imprudent from the business standpoint to have asked them to
increase cash losses to pay higher wages. Such a policy could
only end in going out of business at a faster rate, and then there
would be no employment. The only cash from which the wages
of the country can safely be paid in a period of rising prices and
increasing activity is that represented by the proceeds of the
current sale of goods.
The code makers then adopted a second theory to the effect
that, if all units in an industry were required to sell their goods for
cost or more, the problem of providing money to pay wages
would have been met. Here again, the end desired was used as
the means, and many codes were adopted which prohibited
“sales below cost.” Business leaders then asked, quite naturally,
how goods could be sold at such an arbitrary price if it was so
high that the consumers would not pay it, or if some other pro
ducer could sell at less under the code, because his cost was less.
The latter part of this problem also involved a definition of “cost,”
since very few codes specifically defined the term which, by law,
was the bottom below which selling prices could not drop. Many
employers were already selling goods at less than cost under the
old wage scales because no markets were available at higher
prices and the adoption of codes did not provide any additional
markets. Some attempts were made, without much success,
to have codes approved which would, in effect, have guaranteed
a profit by law.
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While many of the codes which were approved that contained
some form of prohibition of sales below cost also contained a
requirement for the development of a uniform method of cost
finding to enable the units in the respective industries to determine
their costs on a uniform basis, many of them did not. When an
attempt was made to define cost, the language used for these
provisions, and the meaning thereof, differed widely in the various
codes. The theory most favored by N. R. A. appeared to be
that no unit in an industry should be permitted to sell below its
own individual cost, unless necessary to meet the competition of
another unit which was selling below the first unit’s cost but not
below its own cost. To meet such competition, the minimum
price permitted to the higher cost producer was that quoted by
the other. But since, in most cases, cost was not defined, this
theory could not be enforced in practice and the effect was, of
necessity, largely psychological.
Now let us consider what these provisions meant.
To the casual reader, a legal prohibition against sales below
cost appears simple and innocuous enough—in fact, many would
think that anyone who needed a law to prevent his selling below
cost should have his brain examined. But this theory is not
nearly as simple—nor perhaps as innocuous—as it seems.
It will help us to understand the necessity for some provision of
this kind if we consider the chaotic condition of our price struc
ture during the depression, and then examine its cause. The
fundamental cause was our excess capacity to produce and to do
practically everything, on the basis of the demand then existing,
and in many cases, on the basis of any potential demand.
In passing, I might refer to the belief of many economists that
there can never be real overcapacity while anyone lacks any
thing he would like to have, and to their contention that the whole
trouble with our economic system is in the distribution of the
things produced. It seems to me that this is true only to a lim
ited extent. It fails to take into account the fact that, in any
form of society, those men whose toil has been rewarded with the
things they want are apt to desire to reduce the amount of their
toil rather than to continue working to supply the drones with
the things the latter are too lazy to produce for themselves. This
simply means that it is possible to have excess capacity and sup
plies while there is still want, because those in want will not work.
At the present time, there is also need for things we have the
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capacity to produce because those needing these things can not
find employment, and that is a defect of our distribution system.
The effect of this overcapacity on prices may be shown by re
ferring to cost accounting. The expenses incurred in producing
an article were originally classified by cost accountants in three
groups: (1) the cost of the materials contained therein, known as
direct materials, (2) the wages paid to the workmen who actually
worked on the article directly or through a machine, known as
direct labor, and (3) the other expenses of operating the plant,
commonly known as overhead.
Under later developments of the art, cost accountants also
made another classification of operating expenses to show: (1) the
total cost of producing any article made and (2) the cost to the
organization if it produced a certain article, which it would not
have to meet if that article were not produced—i. e., the out-ofpocket cost.
The difference between the “total cost” and the “out-of-pocket
cost” represents the so-called invariable overhead. This differ
ence may be very important in large industrial units. When an
organization is able to sell as much as it can produce, it is con
cerned with the first, or total cost, of each article sold and natu
rally bases its selling prices on that cost, since that is the only
method of getting a profit. But when it is producing and selling
at much less than capacity, sales based on “out-of-pocket” costs
can assume a peculiar significance as a means of reducing losses.
For example, consider a company which can produce 500,000
units of an article in a year but, at a given time, is only producing
at the rate of 100,000 units a year and has a total cost of doing
business on that basis of $1,000,000 per annum. The total cost
of producing each article is then $1,000,000 divided by 100,000, or
$10 each. Now let us assume further that of the $1,000,000 total
cost of doing business, $400,000 represented taxes, insurance,
rent, depreciation, unavoidable maintenance, salaries of the essen
tial non-operating personnel which can not be discharged without
going out of business permanently, and similar expenses which
would be just the same whether the plant operated or not, in
other words, the unavoidable overhead. We see then that the
remainder of $600,000 represents the expense the company had
because it produced the 100,000 articles in excess of the expense
it would have had if it had produced nothing. On that basis,
the out-of-pocket cost of each article was $6.
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It seems quite logical for a particular management to feel that
if it can sell these articles at $8 each, it is better than not operat
ing, even though it realizes that if that policy is continued long
enough, it will put the concern out of business, because of the
losses incurred in paying out cash for the invariable overhead
expenses. If each unit in the industry produced no more than its
own share of the total production of the industry, and if the price
of $8 which was obtained was uniform for all and was the highest
possible price that could be obtained for that industry’s products
under existing conditions, such a policy could be economically
justifiable even though sales were made below total cost. But
uses have been made of this spread between total cost and out-ofpocket costs that are not justifiable from the viewpoint of the
industry as a whole.
During the depression many managements looked with longing
eyes at their idle capacity, such as that in our example, which
could produce 400,000 more units, and reasoned that if they
could get some of the business that would normally go to another
producer, by quoting a price of $7 for it, they would still be $1 per
unit better off than if they did not get the additional business at
all; and they would also be able to distribute the out-of-pocket
labor cost to their own workmen. It was the policy of taking
business on that basis, sometimes called predatory price cutting,
that caused the final collapse of the price structure. In self
defense, the unit that lost the business had to try to regain it or
other similar business from someone else, by cutting prices still
further, until finally the whole industry would be selling at or
near the out-of-pocket cost of $6 per unit. In fact, those con
cerns which did not have good cost systems frequently met the
competition by going below $6 since they did not know what
their out-of-pocket costs were. To attempt to protect their
dwindling cash resources resulting from this policy, producers
had no alternative but to reduce their expenses, including wages.
But then the whole vicious circle started over again. It is not
difficult to see how easy it was for purchasers to develop a buyer’s
market under these conditions.
It must be admitted that good cost accounting systems and an
accurate knowledge of costs on the part of some units at least in
an industry actually accelerated this process, because it could be
accurately shown that for a single unit, and for the moment, re
sults were improved by taking business on that basis. But the
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advantage gained could only be temporary. One can easily
correct ignorant selling below out-of-pocket costs, because it is
possible to show that is silly. It simply means there is less cash
in the till after the transaction is completed than there was
before. That can be corrected by adequate systems of cost finding
and by education. Sales deliberately made at an out-of-pocket
loss by a strong unit, which can afford to suffer the loss tempo
rarily, to drive a weaker competitor out of business, are another
matter. These are criminal activities and should be corrected by
punishment through legal methods.
When we consider sales made at prices falling in the twilight
zone between total costs and out-of-pocket costs, we are faced
with important business and economic considerations that are
not so readily answerable.
An expression frequently used in codes prohibited sales below
the “cost of production.” I assume that “cost of production”
thus used was intended to mean out-of-pocket costs as I have de
fined them. A lower limit, such as that for an industry based on
the costs of the lowest-cost producer, means exactly nothing in
the way of protection for the industry. Other codes specified
the items to be included in calculating costs, and when you had
taken them all in, you had approximately “total cost.”
There is no doubt that a prohibition of sales below total cost
would be an effective method of enabling all the present business
units to stay in business and continue to be able to pay wages, if
consumers had sufficient purchasing power to fill their require
ments at prices calculated on that basis. In view of our present
excess industrial capacity, it is probable that any minimum cost
prescribed for an industry would be the cost at which the products
of that industry would be sold. For if “total costs” are used as
a minimum, even if they are the “total costs” of the “low cost”
units or of the “efficient producers,” they will enable most of the
high cost producers to stagger along hoping that more demand
will develop and that “supply” will again become a factor in
establishing the price structure on a basis that will enable low-cost
producers to make a profit and high-cost producers to break
even.
Under the “survival of the fittest” idea, the present situation
as to excess capacity would be corrected by the bankruptcies of
the financially weak and the inefficient units until supply and
demand approached each other on the basis of conditions existing
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at the moment of approach. In industries in which we are cer
tain that the present excess capacity will be permanent, it would
be most unwise to interfere with this process. But when it is
reasonably certain that the excess capacity will again be needed
in the near future, it appears sounder economically and requires
less toil from man in the aggregate to try to save the units we now
have rather than to destroy some of them and later on find it
necessary to replace them. Moreover, destroying units and con
centrating production in other units frequently is a great hardship
to labor, which may find it necessary to move its residence to the
areas containing the surviving units in order that employment
may be found.
Another objection to the bankruptcy method is the length of
time required to eliminate the weakest units when all are fairly
strong, and the enervating effect on the survivors of the inter
necine struggle. This factor is more important now than for
merly because of the tremendous investments in plant and equip
ment that are necessary for modern industrial operations. Cash
expenditures for these assets have been made in the past and—
thanks to the ease with which stock sold during the boom—have
been largely paid. A prudent management knows that it
must provide for the deterioration in and replacement of its
equipment by providing a depreciation fund out of its sales prices.
On the other hand, a management which is fighting for its exist
ence knows that there is little salvage value in an abandoned
plant, and rightly decides that it is better to sell without pro
viding for depreciation than not to sell at all, since depreciation
does not represent a current out-of-pocket cost. If the weaker
units set selling prices on this basis, the stronger ones are greatly
handicapped in maintaining their business and prices on a basis
which will care for depreciation.
If this question were to be approached on a sound economic
basis, it would be necessary for someone to decide which industries
should be permitted to have price protection to maintain the
status quo of the present units, because their full capacity will
soon be needed, and which industries should be required to work
out their destiny by jungle law. The important phrase in the
preceding sentence is “it would be necessary for someone to
decide” and the practical problem is to find the “someone” who
could and would decide equitably in all cases. This “someone”
who sits as the judge would need to have an accuracy of vision
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and a disinterestedness which it is difficult to associate with
ordinary mortals.
However this question of over-capacity is finally settled, there
is no doubt that those organizations which have adequate cost
data will be in the most favorable position to find their proper
place in their own industry. So far as I have been able to learn,
there was not much real progress under N. R. A. in assisting busi
ness units to determine their costs better than they did before,
although there was much talk on the subject. And that is
natural, for the development of this information must be expected
to require a considerable period of time. I would estimate that if
every possible effort were made, it would require from two to five
years before really comparable cost data could be obtained in an
important industry producing diversified products. The installa
tion and maintenance of a cost system requires the outlay of a
considerable amount of money, although executives generally
realize that cost data are worth all they cost. But at a time when
business was faced with the necessity of decreasing and not in
creasing current expenses, it was natural that managements should
want to know if N. R. A. was apt to be continued on some basis
that would permit a use to be made of data that would justify the
cost of getting it. Today I am inclined to believe that the anti
trust laws will be so modified as to permit the intelligent coopera
tive use of cost data, and if this should be so, there will be plenty of
work for all the competent cost accountants in the country for
many years to come.
A cost accounting system should never be developed until one
has become familiar, in the full detail, with the manufacturing
operations and the factory layouts in the organizations involved.
In other words, it is not a swivel chair job and a man who can not
feel at home in the midst of factory operations should never at
tempt to design a detailed system of cost finding. One must get
into the factory, talk to the foremen and to the workers, observe
how their work is done and make each installation fit the par
ticular factory in which it is to be used. That would not be
necessary if the various units in an industry all made the same
things in the same way, but unfortunately, that is not the case.
There is a great overlapping of products, and there is also a very
real difference in the detailed procedure of manufacturing the
same product in different plants. I do not mean to say that the
same principles of cost finding can not be applied throughout an
industry, or that the final reports prepared can not be in the same
292

“No Sales Below Cost"

form; but prescribing basic principles and the form of reports
will not mean much in the way of really comparable data unless
the basic principles are applied to a particular situation in such a
manner as to reflect fully the manufacturing peculiarities of that
organization.
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